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THE POLITICAL IMPASSE IN FARM SUPPORT
LEGISLATION*
To alleviate the severe depression in agriculture during the 1930's, Congress
passed the Agricultural Adjustment Acts.' Although the emergency of the
thirties has long passed, the approach of that emergency legislation still forms
the basis of our laws.2 Now, as then, the government undertakes to control
supplies and to support prices at "parity" levels. If the producers of desig-
nated crops, called "basic" crops,3 agree to restrict the number of acres in
production, they become eligible to receive government loans secured by the
crops they produce.4 The amount loaned per bushel or pound of production is
determined by the percent of "parity" established by law. A full, or 100% of
parity price would give agricultural commodities a purchasing power with
respect to articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power of
agricultural commodities in an earlier period, designated to serve as a stand-
ard of normalcy. 5 Theoretically, the acreage restrictions should so reduce
supply that market prices would rise above the percent of parity loaned,
causing farmers to pay off their loans and sell their crops. Since the loans
are secured only by the crops themselves, 6 if the supply did not decrease, or
*The Yale Law Journal wishes to acknowledge its great debt for many of the ideas
expressed herein to Professor Robert H. Salisbury, Department of Political Science,
Washington University, and to thank Professor Salisbury for permission to draw on re-
search conducted by him. While our debt is great, he should not be held responsible for any
misuse of his labors.
1. Agricultural Adjustment Act, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) ; Soil Conservation & Domestic
Allotment Act, 49 Stat. 1148 (1936), 7 U.S.C. §§ 612c & 624, 16 U.S.C. §§ 590g-590q
(1958) ; Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 31 (1938), 7 U.S.C. §§ 612c, 1281-
1407, 1501-19 (1958), 16 U.S.C. §§ 5901, 590o (1959).
For a contemporary discussion of the emergency necessitating remedial legislation, see
Jennings & Sullivan, Legal Planning for Agriculture, 42 YALE L.J. 878 (1933).
2. See note 1 supra. In spite of the anachronism, present bills are still called "emer-
gency" programs. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1961, p. 1, cols. 2-3.
3. See BENEDICT, FARm POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1950 at 302 n.67 (1953).
Certain "designated nonbasic" commodities are also supported; see 7 U.S.C. §§ 1446-49
(1958).
4. BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 332; KOONTZ & GABLE, PUBLIC CONTROL OF
ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE 653 (1956).
5. The definition given is substantially that of the original Agricultural Adjustment
Act, 48 Stat. 32 (1933). The definition has since been amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1301 (a) (1)-(2)
(1958), to accord with the new method of computing parity, adopted to "give recognition to
changes in relationships among the prices of agricultural commodities themselves which
have occurred since the base period 1910-1914," 7 U.S.C. § 1301 ("Amendments," 1948).
The base period originally was 1909-14, 48 Stat. 32 (1933), but there have been some
modifications in this period, and in the way it is applied to different crops. See BENEDICT,
FARM POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1950 at 376, 475-78, 483 (1953).
6. Since the loans are "without recourse," if at the end of the loan period the market
price of the crop given as security is below the loan level, the farmer may default on the
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the demand increase, sufficiently to raise the market price above the loan level,
farmers would choose to keep the greater loan amounts, and let the govern-
ment foreclose on the crops. The consequent removal of a part of the supply
from the market, into government storage, would work to increase the
market price-hopefully, above the loan levels so that the government would
stop accumulating supplies. Thus, theoretically, the programs would work to
even out fluctuations in supply,7 and to "support" prices by balancing sup-
ply with demand at the specified percent of a parity price. However, economic
changes, especially technological innovations in agricultural production,8 have
made these supports and controls even less effective. Over the long run, sup-
plies have not been reduced, prices have remained below the support-loan
levels set by law, and the government has accumulated tremendous quanti-
ties of the supported crops. There are now nearly nine billion dollars worth
of agricultural commodities stockpiled, 9 the storage of which, alone, costs the
government over one and one-half million dollars per day.' 0 Virtually no
one likes these results." Since there has been such full discussion of the
disadvantages of the programs in both popular 12 and scholarly 1 publications,
little would be gained by further detailing here the standard outrages and
the commonplace enormities. The difficult question is: given the undesirability
of the present situation, what can, in fact, be done about it?
There is considerable agreement on many broad, long-range objectives.14
But there is general disagreement as to how these goals should be implement-
ed. Candidates and administrations, universities and farm organizations turn
loan without being personally liable for the difference between the market value of the crop
and the total loan amount; BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 332; KOONTZ & GABLE, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 653.
7. This is similar to the "ever-normal granary" concept, see BENEDICT, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 333-34.
8. See note 122 infra and accompanying text.
9. President John F. Kennedy, Message to Congress of Jan. 31, 1962; N.Y. Times, Feb.
1, 1962, p. 14, col. 2. The estimate given was "over $9,000,000,000" for "the beginning of
1961."
10. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1961, p. 25, col. 1.
11. See Davis, The Executive and Farm Policy, 331 Annals 92, 94 (1960).
12. See, e.g., The Farm Problem, Life Magazine, Nov. 30, 1959, p. 24 (pt. 1) ; Dec. 7,
1959, p. 136 (pt. 2), Dec. 14, 1949, p. 101 (pt. 3); New Republic, Dec. 5, 1960, p. 8;
Saturday Evening Post, May 30, 1959, p. 10; 101 AmERICA 506 (1959) ; Moley, Politics &
the Farmers, Newsweek, Aug. 29, 1960, p. 90.
13. See, e.g., Brandt, Guidelines for a Constructive Revision of Agricultural Policy in
the Coining Decade, 43 J. FARM ECON. 1 (1961); Farnsworth, The Problem Multiplying
Effects of Special Wheat Programs, 51 Am. EcoN. REV., PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 353
(1961) ; Johnson, Government & Agriculture: Is Agriculture a Special Case?, 1 J. LAW &
EcoN. 122 (1958).
14. See, e.g., President John F. Kennedy, Message to Congress df Jan. 31, 1962, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 1, 1962, p. 14, col. 8; HEADY, AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROBLEM s IN A
GROWING ECONOMY vii (1958). Although all factions profess agreement on such broad
goals as increased farm income, reduced government expenditure, and maximum freedom for
the farmer, these goals have no functional meaning or importance. They do not provide a
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out one "solution" after another.15 Although many may be economically sound,
none has been adopted by Congress.
Conflicts among various political interest groups have prevented innovation
in farm policy. Therefore, meaningful debate about possible solutions requires
an understanding of the limitations imposed by the realities of politics. This
Comment will describe the political interest groups active in the area of farm
price-support legislation,16 and explain why and where the conflicts among
them arise. Next, it will examine the effects of these political factors on the
fate of a few of the more important recent proposals. Finally, having sug-
gested the political requisites of a solution, the Comment will estimate which
kinds of programs, if any, are likely to be enacted in the near future.
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
Classically defined, a political interest or interest group is men, formally
organized or not, who desire to obtain advantages through government, and
who thereby come into conflict with other men. 1 Conflict results either be-
cause the same advantage is desired by both groups, and is scarce,18 or be-
cause the second group would be at a relative disadvantage if the first group
obtained its desires. 19 This definition emphasizes groups because an indi-
vidual cannot generally be a significant factor in governmental politics 20 un-
basis for deciding whether to favor a proposed plan, nor, therefore, do they influence the
actions politicians take.
15. See text at notes 128-62 infra.
16. For the most part, the interest groups active on agricultural legislation are those
directly involved with agriculture-e.g., producers of agricultural commodities, processors
of those commodities, manufacturers of farm implements. Interests outside the sphere of
agriculture, such as labor unions, may occasionally take an active role; see the testimony
of labor leaders in Hearings Before the House Committee on Agriculture, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. E, at 267, 319, 320 (1955) ; note 146 infra and accompanying text. But they
seldom do so, and when they do, it is usually the result of an alliance with some particular
farm interests, see note 183 infra and accompanying text. Not only are the interest
groups active on farm legislation largely confined to those engaged in agriculture, but, in
fact, the effective groups are even more limited. The shape of our farm programs is deter-
mined, to a very great degree, by groups representing only the larger, commercial
farmers; Hardin, The Politics of Agriculture in the United States, 32 J. FARM EcoN.
573 (1950).
17. See BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 211-12, 222 (1949 ed.); TRUMAN,
THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 33, 502-03 (1955). Political scientists will recognize that
the analytical approach of this Comment is, generally, Bentleyan. It is not thought that
Bentley's system accounts for the totality of political behavior, but only that the Bentley-
Truman framework has proven to be a useful and productive tool in this case.
18. See Kling, Book Review, 71 YALE L.J. 182, 185 (1961).
19. See text at notes 28-29 infra. Professor Truman has summed it up: "The activi-
ties of political interest groups imply controversy and conflict, the essence of politics."
TRUMAN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 502-03.
20. The term "governmental politics" is used to make it clear that the reference is to
large-scale politics, as distinguished from small-scale, interpersonal, or "closed" politics; for




less other individuals join with him.21 It requires no formal organization of
groups because even unorganized groups can be effective political forces.
22
And it uses the terms interest and interest group interchangeably because the
present existence of a group is not required, but only the present existence of
a common interest which could become an effective political force if that in-
terest became the subject of political controversy.
23
Since agricultural price-support laws are a form of economic regulation,
the groups concerned with them are usually based on economic interests.
24
Rational, objective economic self-interest is not the sole determinant of poli-
tical behavior; such behavior reflects the totality of the experiences of each of
the participants.25 For example, a strong commitment to individualism rooted
in religious beliefs may lead a farmer to place a higher value on goals other
than maximum economic advantage, or may even shape his perception of the
direction in which his economic interests lie.26 It is generally true, however,
that farmers align themselves in accordance with identifiable economic inter-
ests and make political demands which would advance those interests.
27




Where different crops compete for the same market, conflict may occur.
To the extent a law benefits one crop, it puts the others at a competitive dis-
advantage. There are two major conflicts of this type. Since soybeans, corn,
cottonseeds, dairy fats, and lard from meat animals are alternative sources
21. See TRUMAN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 502. Even an individual of great wealth,
power, or influence will be effective only if he uses those powers to obtain the support of
other individuals.
22. Id. at 51-52.
23. Ibid.
24. Two recent analysts of farm politics, in purporting to give expositions of the
relevant interest groups, mention only economic interests; see Jones, Representation in
Congress: The Case of the House Agriculture Committee, 55 Am. POL. Sci. Rzv. 359-61
(1961) ; Talbot, Farm Legislation in the 86th Congress, 43 J. FARM ECON. 590-91 (1961).
See also, Tolley, The Administration's Score on the First Round, 43 J. FARM EcoN. 1032,
1036 (1961).
25. See generally, e.g., LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY & POuaTics (1930) ; for a dis-
cussion of psychological factors specifically in farm politics, see Parks, Historical Goals &
Political Behavior in Agriculture, in HEADY, op. cit. supra note 14, at 270.
26. See, e.g., the remarks of Charles Shuman, President of the American Farm
Bureau Federation, at their recent national convention:
The farm leader, who teaches Sunday school in Sullivan, Ill., said economic law was
closely related to moral law. "When we turn to Government to negate economic
truth and to avoid adjustments that are demanded by changing conditions," he said,
"we are in reality rejecting God's law in favor of man's law."
N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1961, p. 30, cols. 2-4.
27. See Pennock, Party & Constituency in Postwar Agricultural Price-Support
Legislation, 18 J. POLITICS 167, 209 (1956).
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for many fats, oils and shortenings, bills which benefit producers of one meet
opposition from producers of the others.28 Likewise, corn interests oppose bills
which would make wheat competitive with corn as a source of feed.20 At
present, artificially high wheat prices maintained by the government preclude
this use.
Supplier-Consumer Relation
Where some crops are consumed in the production of other agricultural
commodities and the consumers do not themselves produce substantial
amounts of these crops, their interest will conflict with the suppliers' interest.
Livestock producers generally oppose any program which would increase their
costs by raising feed grain prices.30 Since the demand for any given meat is
highly elastic, 3' livestock men believe they cannot increase prices to cover the
increased feed costs without substantially reducing their sales. But there are
some exceptions. Where farmers raising livestock also grow feed grains, they
are less likely to oppose grain supports.32 Hog and dairy farmers fall into this
category.3 3 Similarly, where the demand for livestock products is highly in-
elastic as in the case of fluid milk,3 4 these producers have less to fear from
increased costs because they can raise prices with little effect on sales. And
where periods of gestation and maturation differ among livestock, producers
of animals with short periods such as hogs may be more fearful of lower feed
prices than producers of animals with longer periods such as cattle.35 Since
this difference in gestation and maturation periods causes the cattle market to
respond more slowly than the hog market to an increase in grain supplies, hog
producers have a more immediate fear that their own market will be glutted.
"Diverted Acres"
Even where two crops do not compete for the same markets, government
programs favoring one may have a detrimental effect on the other. When
acreage allotments are placed on a crop to reduce its supply and raise its price,
28. 104 CONG. REC. 15157 (1958) (remarks of Senator Douglas); 104 CONG. REc.
15312 (1958) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
29. See Farm Journal, Nov. 1958, p. 8; e.g., Hearings Before the House Committee on
Agriculture, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. UU, at 95, 119 (1960) (remarks of Representative
Hoeven).
30. Pennock, supra note 27, at 176, 186. See N.Y. Times, June 4, 1961, p. 57, col. 2;
April 26, 1961, p. 22, col. 3; 103 CoNG. REc. 5422 (1957) (remarks of Senator Malone).
31. HALCROW, AGRICULTURAL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 71 (1953).
32. Interview with Hon. E.A. Jaenke, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Jan. 12, 1962.
33. Ibid.
34. HALCROW, op. cit. supra note 31, at 71.
35. See Statement of E. Howard Hill, President, Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, as
quoted in "Farmers Never Win Gambling With Cheap Feed" (undated pamphlet, National
Farmers Union). For a discussion of the way in which the hog market responds, see CocH-
ANE, FARm PRcEs 72-75 (1958). The period of gestation of a cow is 9 months, and that
of a sow 4 months; WESTa's NEw INTERNATIONAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 952 (3d ed.
[Vol. 71 :952
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the acres diverted from the production of that crop may be used to grow
another 2 6 The increased supply of this second crop will depress its price, in-
juring those who had been producing it.37 When acreage controls were im-
posed on cotton and wheat producers, many of them diverted some of their
acres into production of feed grain, increasing its supply and decreasing its
price.38 Since climate, terrain, legal impediments, or the lack of expertise and
capital may make it difficult for old feed grain producers to compensate for
their decreased income by going into production of other crops, they opposed
these controls.3 9 The use of diverted acres could create conflicts between a
large number of crops which might be controlled, and a large number of other
crops which might be grown in their place.40
Agricultural Budget Allocation
Further conflicts may develop in the process of allocating the agricultural
budget among different crops. Since the amount of funds that can be secured
for price support programs is limited, and especially since legislators have
perceived this to be the case,41 all crops may compete among themselves to
maximize their individual shares of the available funds.
42
1961) (under "gestation") ; Hogs are marketed at an age of from six to twelve months; 18
ENcyc. BRITANNICA 244 (1957) ; but even "baby beef" is from ten to sLxteen months old;
3 ENcyc. BRIrANNICA 311 (1957).
36. 104 CONG. REc. 16452 (1958) (remarks of Representative Harvey) ; Hardin, Farm
Price Policy and the Farm Vote, 37 J. FARm EcoN. 601, 609 (1955) ; MCCONNELL, THE
DECLINE OF AGRARIAN DEmocRACY 79 (1953).
37. Ibid.
38. See Remarks of Representative Harvey in 104 CoNG. REc., op. cit. mpra note 36.
39. Interview with Charles Shuman, President of the American Farm Bureau Federa-
tion, July 1, 1959.
40. See, e.g., the complaint of rice and sweet potato interests that they had been dam-
aged by new production coming from acres diverted from cotton; Statement of Malcolm
Dougherty, President, Louisiana Farm Bureau, Hearings on Proposed Modifications of the
General Farm Program Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 2557 (1955).
41. See 103 CONG. REc. 16551-55 (1957) (extension of remarks of Representative
Harold Cooley, Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture).
42. Some of this took place in 1958 when Secretary Benson made it very clear that he
would approve favorable treatment for a few crops, but not for all. In order to maintain
their advantage, the favored crops were compelled to assist Benson in achieving his goal of
lowered supports for the other crops. See Wall Street Journal, Aug. 2, 1958, p. 1; 104
CONG. REc. 15157 (1958) (remarks of Senator Douglas). Another recent manifestation
of such conflict occurred in dividing up the limited amount of Soil Bank funds in 1956.
Interview with Hon. E. A. Jaenke, June 16, 1959.
This "slice of the pie" type of conflict also occurred in 1936 after the invalidation of
the original AAA by the "Hoosac Mills" case; U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). Congress
made an appropriation of $500 million for the relief of agriculture as a stop-gap measure to
keep the whole program from collapsing. At a meeting at the Peabody Hotel, representa-
tives of the various groups within agriculture attempted to split up this pot, and consider-
able conflict over how much each crop was to receive was, of course, the result. Interview
with Mr. Wayne Darrow, publisher of the Washington Farmiletter, July 8, 1959.
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Intra-Crop Conflicts
New Areas v. Old Areas
When it becomes profitable to produce a crop in a new area, the interests
of those who historically have grown the crop may conflict with the interests
of the new producers. This conflict has occurred in both cotton and wheat. In
an attempt to raise cotton prices, Congress restricted cotton acreage during
the 1930's.4 3 Growing privileges were allotted to individual farms on the basis
of what the land had produced on the average in several prior years.44 Dur-
ing World War II Congress dropped these restrictions. 45 Increased wartime
demand combined with technological innovations to stimulate new cotton pro-
duction in the western states.46 Since the war, the old cotton South has at-
tempted to stem this movement by supporting reinstatement of high support
programs with acreage restrictions based on past production.47 This interest
collides with that of the new producers. The latter group desires freedom to
expand production.48 Since they can grow cotton more efficiently,49 lower
prices have less impact on their profit margins. Moreover, lower prices may
allow these growers to expand sales in foreign markets -5 and even to capture
the domestic markets of the old growers by driving them out of business.r'
Similarly, old wheat producers have sought to limit new sources of wheat.r2
Government programs have raised wheat prices to attractive levels.63 Although
these programs include history-based production restrictions, many Corn Belt
farmers with no history of wheat production have been able to take advantage
of the guaranteed, high wheat prices because the law has permitted any farm-
43. MIGHELL & BLACK, INTERREGIONAL COmPETITION IN AGRICULTURE 274-75 (1951).
44. Interview with Dr. W.W. Wilcox, Agricultural Specialist, Legislative Reference
Service, Library of Congress, June 24, 1959.
45. Ibid.; MIGHELL & BLAcx, op. cit. supra note 43, at 274-75.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid; Interview with Representative E.C. Gathings, Member, House Committee on
Agriculture, June 24,1959.
48. Ibid; see 104 CONG. REC. 15160 (1958) (remarks of Senator Goldwater).
49. Interview with Henry Casso, Staff Economist, Senate Agriculture Committee, June
22, 1959. In 1953, Georgia averaged 262 pounds of cotton per acre while Arizona averaged
743. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1955 at
680 (76th ed. 1955). See also U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURE INFORMATION
BULL. No. 230, FARM COSTS AND RETURNS 36-47 (rev. ed. 1961).
50. See Cochrane, Demand Expansion-Opportunities and Limitations, 1, in PROBLEMS
AND POLICIES OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 283 (Iowa State ed. 1959) ; N.Y. Times, Oct. 22,
1961 (Financial), p. F14, col. 8.
51. Interview, File No. 20, June 1959 (on file at Department of Political Science,
Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.); see N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1961 (Financial), p. F9,
col. 4.
52. Interviews with John Baker, Legislative Director, National Farmers Union, July 2,





er to grow at least fifteen acres.5 4 Since this exemption has benefitted these
new wheat producers but has hurt old producers by glutting their market, the
exemption has become the subject of political controversy.55
Proximity to Markets
When commodities are perishable, and historically have been produced near
consumers, differences in proximity to markets provide another basis for
conflict among producers. Farmers near markets argue for controls which will
insulate their historical markets from more distant suppliers.56 But to the
extent technological innovations allow the more distant suppliers to sell
profitably in these markets,57 they oppose such controls.58 This conflict has
been especially intense in the determination of so-called "milkshed" areas sur-
rounding large milk-consuming centersY9
Competing Varieties and Grades
As with different crops, different varieties and grades of the same crop
which compete for the same markets may conflict over programs which would
give one a competitive advantage over others. This conflict occurs only where
the differing varieties cannot be grown on the same land; otherwise disad-
vantaged producers could switch to the favored variety. Arguing that their
particular variety was not in surplus, but that in fact their crop's special at-
tributes caused more demand for it than could be filled under existing acreage
restrictions, producers of certain types of wheat have secured special, more
favored treatment in wheat legislation.60 Growers of other, more abundant
54. Ibid; Interviews with Cotys Mouser, Chief Clerk, Senate Agriculture Committee,
June 22, 1959, and Mabel Snyder, Agricultural Assistant to Senator Humphrey, June 26,
1959. In one Illinois county during the 1930s there were 126 farmers producing wheat, while
in 1957, in the same county, there were 1,200; 104 CONG. REc. 14947 (1958) (remarks of
Senator Anderson). In 1956 alone, there were 10,006 new wheat growers in Illinois, 6,308
in Indiana, and 3,867 in Ohio-in that year approximately one million new acres were
planted to wheat in the Corn Belt; 103 CONG. REc. 5433 (1957) (remarks of Senator
Carlson).
55. See note 52 supra.
56. Cf. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 31, 1961, p. 1, col. 1.
57. See MIGHELL & BLACK, INTERREGIONAL COMPETIION IN AGRICULTURE 276-78
1951).
58. Interview with E.M. Norton, President, and Patrick B. Healy, Secretary, of the
National Milk Producers Federation, June 22, 1959.
59. Interviews with Hon. E. A. Jaenke, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Jan. 12, 1962, and
Dr. W.W. Wilcox, Library of Congress, June 24, 1959; see N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1962, p.
18, col. 1; see also Wall Street Journal, Oct. 31, 1961, p. 12, col. 2, and December 13, 1961,
p. 1, col. 1; Hutt, Restrictions on the Free Movement of Fluid Milk Under Federal Milk
Marketing Orders, 37 U. DEr. L.J. 525, 531 (1960).
60. Interviews with Hon. E. A. Jaenke, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Jan. 12, 1962; John
Baker, Legislative Director, National Farmers Union, June 29, 1959; Mabel Snyder, Agri-
cultural Assistant to Senator Humphrey, June 26, 1959.
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varieties opposed such treatment because buyers who were unable to get
enough of the preferred variety of wheat had been buying the more abundant
variety as a substitute.0 1 Similarly, in seeking to have parity computed with
long-staple cotton as the base, the newer, long-staple cotton producers seek
advantages over the older, short-staple producers.6 2 Since in free markets the
higher quality long-staple cotton would bring higher prices, 63 and since relative
price differences among varieties are maintained under the parity system,4 this
method of computing parity accords all cotton relatively low prices, a goal
sought by the newer, more efficient, long-staple, western growers and resisted
by the older, less efficient, short-staple, eastern growers.
65
The Inverse
Where none of the conditions previously discussed are met, conflicts are
not likely to occur. Tobacco price support programs, for example, have not
engendered inter-crop conflicts.66 Since no other crop can be used as a sub-
stitute for tobacco, there is no inter-crop competition. Tobacco is not consumed
in the production of other agricultural commodities. There have been relative-
ly few acres diverted from tobacco to other crops as a result of acreage con-
trols. 67 Since small decreases in tobacco supplies increase prices significant-
ly,68 tobacco programs have required little government subsidy,0 9 decreasing
the likelihood of conflicts over budget allocation. Moreover, there has been
little conflict within tobacco.70 Different varieties of tobacco do not compete:
they each have distinct uses. 71 Since each variety can be grown in only a few
well-defined areas,72 these areas are substantially immune from competition
from any new areas. Moreover, differences in proximity to markets are not
crucial in tobacco.73 Therefore, each of the reasons for conflict enumerated
61. Ibid. There is also some conflict among the various varieties and grades of wheat
based on differential levels of export subsidy. For a description of the different problems of
each of several varieties and grades of wheat, see BENEDICT, CAN WE SOLVE THE FARM
PROBLEM? 502-03 (1955) ; Farnsworth, The Problem Multiplying Effects of Special Wheat
Programs, 51 A.m. EcoN. R.V, PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 353, 353-54 (1961).
62. Interview with Hon. E. A. Jaenke, June 16,1959.
63. Ibid; Interview with Dr. W. W. Wilcox, Agricultural Economist, Legislative
Reference Service, Library of Congress, June 24, 1959.
64. See note 62 supra.
65. Ibid.; N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1961 (Financial), p. F9, col. 4.
66. See sburces cited in note 74 infra.
67. This is true simply because tobacco is grown on so few acres. Interview with Hon.
E. A. Jaenke, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Jan. 12, 1962.
68. See HALCRow, AGRICULTURAL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 71-72 (1953).
69. 100 CONG. RFc. 133 (1954) (message of President Eisenhower).
70. Interview with Hon. E. A. Jaenke, June 16, 1959.
71. Interviews with Dr. W. W. Wilcox, Legislative Reference Service, Library of
Congress, June 24, 1959, and Henry Casso, Staff Economist, Senate Agriculture Com-
mittee, June 22, 1959.
72. Ibid; 100 CONG. REc. 133 (1954) (message of President Eisenhower).
73. Because tobacco can easily be shipped long distances to market, no historical
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above is not present in tobacco, and the tobacco programs have, in fact,
proved particularly non-controversial in Congress.
74
Political Variables
The shape that these inter-crop and intra-crop economic conflicts take in
Congress may be conditioned by other, political factors. Some crops have
superior access to key points in the legislative process. For instance, the
Chairmen of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees are spokesmen
for tobacco and rice interests respectively.75 This not only gives those crops
valuable support, but also discourages other interests from opposing them
lest they should alienate such important legislators. 76 Conflict is further
minimized if the crop interests are small, wealthy businesses. The rela-
tive size and wealth of truck farmers, for example, enables them to exert
pressure on Congress while attracting a minimum of public attention. The
kind of program advocated bears also on the degree of conflict generated.
Compare, for example, "marketing order" 77 programs with price support
programs. Proponents of a marketing order need not request Congress to
review the details of a plan and vote subsidies to support it, but only to
authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to enforce the marketing restriction
plans designed and approved by the growers.78 And once established, market-
ing order programs are rarely reconsidered in Congress since they do not
require periodic appropriations. 79 Thus, the growers of many, smaller, more
specialized crops-because of procedures which attract little attention thereby
marketing patterns existed that could have been institutionalized and fixed by legislation-
such as has been the case in milk where farmers close to a metropolitan center have been
allocated the major portion of that market; see notes 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
74. See interviews cited at note 71 supra; 100 CONG. REc. 133 (1954) (message of
President Eisenhower) ; Williamson & Toussaint, Parity & Support Prices for Flue-Cured
Tobacco, 43 J. FARm EcON. 13 (1961).
75. The Chairman of the House Committee is Representative Harold Cooley, of North
Carolina; for his affiliation with tobacco, see Jones, Representation in Congress: The Case
of the House Agriculture Committee, 55 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 358, 360-61 (1961). The
Chairman of the Senate Committee is Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana. Senator El-
lender is identified with sugar, as well as rice interests; Interview, File No. 15, June 1959
(on file at Department of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.).
76. This is, undoubtedly, another factor tending to make the tobacco programs non-
controversial; see notes 66-74 supra and accompanying text. More members of the House
Agriculture Committee are clearly identified with tobacco than with any single crop; Jones,
supra note 75, at 360.
77. "Marketing orders" may be issued by the Secretary of Agriculture, after notice,
hearing and findings, to regulate the handling of certain agricultural commodities in inter-
state commerce. The orders may limit the total amount of any of these commodities, or any
variety, grade, or quality thereof which can be bought, sold, or transported by all the
handlers of them, and may allocate the total amount among the several handlers. 7 U.S.C.
§ 608(c) (1958).
78. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 31, 1961, p. 1, col. 1.
79. Interview with Hon. E. A. Jaenke, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Jan. 12, 1962.
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minimizing political controversy, and because of the limited amount of govern-
ment activity involved 8 -- have been able to secure beneficial legislation with
relative ease.8'
Broader Interests?
The conflicts discussed so far have been based on individual crop interests
or on interests within a crop. But do larger groups, each of which includes
several crop interests, play significant roles in agricultural policy-making?
The importance of two kinds of larger groups-the political party and the
national farm organization-should be considered.
Political Parties
Since farm policy is one of the few major issues in American politics on
which the Republican and Democratic Party platforms clearly differ, 2 and
since roll call votes in Congress look partisan,8 3 party membership appears to
be an important determinant of politicians' behavior on farm price support
bills. If, however, the makeup of the parties is examined, this behavior can
be as easily explained on the theory that crop interests are the dominant
80. The government's role is, in effect, limited to approving and enforcing a private
"price-fixing conspiracy"; Wall Street Journal, Oct. 31, 1961, p. 1, col. 1.
81. However, a currently proposed turkey marketing order has run into stiff opposi-
tion. Interview with Hon. E. A. Jaenke, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Jan. 12, 1962; see, e.g.,
The Nation's Agriculture, Dec. 1961, pp. 8 -9 .
But, generally, marketing orders have proved a relatively easy way for growers to
secure price protection for their limes or lettuce, hops or honeybees; Jaenke interview,
supra; for a list of crops which have already obtained the congressional authorization
for such programs, see 7 U.S.C. § 608(c) (2) (1958). A reading of the statute also
reveals why these programs have not been opposed by the canners of truck crops. The
statutes exclude from the coverage of the programs that portion of the crop that is "for
canning or freezing" (poignant feelings are aroused by the curious debility of the olive and
asparagus canners, who are specifically excepted from this protection). Instead of suffering
from increased costs due to marketing orders, it is even possible that canners' profits will
be increased. The rise in prices of fresh produce due to marketing orders may make the
canned variety more attractive to consumers. Secondly, the higher prices that the growers
receive for the better grades may permit them to settle for a decreased profit margin on the
lower, canning grades.
82. Compare the Democratic Platform, 15 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC
776, 781-82 (1960) ("Measures to this end include production and marketing quotas
measured in terms of barrels, bushels, and bales, loans on basic commodities at not less
than 90% of parity, production payments, commodity purchases, and marketing orders and
agreements.") ; with the Republican Platform, id. at 794, 797 ("Use of price supports at
levels best fitted to specific commodities, in order to widen markets, ease production con-
trols, and help achieve increased farm family income."). At issue, of course, is the level
of price supports, and the strictness and scope of production controls, rather than the
complete abolition of either supports or controls.




forces. The congressional delegations representing each crop tend to be found
in one party or the other. A survey of the party affiliation of Congressmen
representing districts ranking in the top twenty in the production of each of









Most rice, peanut, cotton, and tobacco producers have in common the desire
for programs of production restrictions and price supports. The Democratic
Party, with which they are aflliated, espouses these programs. Similarly,
many dairymen and corn-hog farmers favor fewer controls, and embrace the
Republican Party, which advocates this approach. 5 Moreover, although there
are conflicts among the crops within each party, the differences in crop in-
terests between the two parties are greater. For example, some Southern
(Democratic) crop interests conflict with Midwestern (Republican) interests
84. The top 20 congressional districts do not necessarily have 20 Representatives,
since a state which elects 2 Representatives at large may rank among the top 20 districts.
In this table, both cotton and wheat have 21 Representatives. This survey was conducted
in collaboration with Professor Salisbury, Washington University. The production rankings
were computed from the county-unit data of the 1954 Census of Agriculture. The table
shows the party affiliation of the Representatives of those districts in the 85th Congress,
2d Session (1958). Survey on file at Department of Political Science, Washington Uni-
versity, St. Louis.
Cf. Jones, supra note 75, at 360.
85. It should be remembered that the great corn producing areas (and thus congres-
sional districts) are largely coterminous with the great hog producing areas. Therefore, the
preferences of their Congressmen for less controls may reflect their livestock producing in-
terests; see note 30 supra and accompanying text. The fact that corn has not had a
serious oversupply problem until relatively recently may also help to explain their lack
of enthusiasm for control and support programs; see U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTuRE, AGRI-
cuLTuRAL STATzSTcs 1960 at 33, Table 44 (1961). However, those farmers who raise corn
for "cash grain" (i.e., they sell much more corn than they buy) have favored price sup-
ports; Interview with Walter Geoppinger, President, National Corn Growers' Association,
at Boone, Iowa, Sept. 1, 1960.
While there are also cross-pressures on dairymen, it has generally been in the interest
of Republican dairy Congressmen to oppose the general farm price support programs be-
cause dairymen are feed consumers, and because they have other, special legal advantages,
outside of the price support laws; see Pennock, Party & Constituency it Postwar Agri-
cultural Price-Support Legislation, 18 J. PoLITics 167, 186-87 (1956) ; but see the reversal
of position of dairy interests in 1958, when their own programs were threatened, Farm
Journal, March 1958, p. 8. See also sources cited at note 59 supra.
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because their products compete.8 6 Party regularity on congressional votes is,
therefore, often consistent with the following of constituency interests.87
Indeed, the nature of the particular crop interests within each party prob-
ably determines the party's agricultural policy. The case of wheat is instruc-
tive. Although one would expect wheat farmers to be aligned with the Demo-
crats because wheat has a chronic problem of oversupply, of the top 20 wheat
districts, 14 have Republican Congressmen. However, these Republicans are
a substantial portion of those few party members who occasionally stray from
the official party position and vote for the Democrats' programs. 88 Further-
more, the Democrats have been making substantial gains in wheat districts
86. 104 CONG. REc. 18862 (1958) (remarks of Representative Andersen). Midwestern
corn, dairy, and soybean fats and oils compete with cottonseed oil; see note 28 supra and
accompanying text. Land diverted from cotton production under control programs may
be used to produce feed grains and livestock, in competition with Midwestern livestock
men; see notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text; and therefore, Midwestern interests
have tended to oppose high support and strict control programs for cotton. At the same
time, Southerners have opposed high support and tight control programs for Midwestern
crops, since the South has been moving into the production of corn, meat, dairy, and
poultry products and would not want history-based allotments to prevent further move-
ment; see Hadwiger, Discussion, in GOALS & VALUES IN AGRICULTURAL POLICY 231, 234
(Iowa State ed. 1961). There has also been some conflict between the two regions over the
allocation of the agricultural budget, especially Soil Bank funds; see note 42 supra and
accompanying text; cf. 104 CONG. REc. 18862 (1958).
87. Furthermore, it is arguable that when the constituency interests within a party
are less homogeneous, there will be less party regularity or "partisanship" on the vote.
Since the Democratic Party has gained many new Congressmen in the Midwest feed
grain producing areas, see 14 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 737-38 (1958), and
since livestock production has become increasingly important in the Southern states,
Johnson & Bachman, Recent Changes in Resource Use & In Farm Incomes, in PROBLE.MiS
& POLICIES OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 9, 19 (Iowa State ed. 1959) ; Hadwiger, supra note
80, at 234, these conflicting crop interests within the Democratic Party have caused it to
display less solidarity. At the same time, since the Republican policies have caused them to
lose seats in areas with high farm price support interests, see 14 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTER-
LY ALMANAC 737-38 (1958), the elimination of these dissident elements from the Re-
publican congressional delegation has caused that Party to display an increased percent
of party regularity. Thus, on the wheat bills in 1959 and 1960, the two parties divided as
follows:
Democrats Republicans
Yea Nay Yea Nay
1959 117 63 12 114
1960 162 100 9 136
15 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 368-69 (1959); 16 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
ALMANAC 456-57 (1960). It is true that a large number of the Democratic dissenters came
from urban districts, but this may merely reflect the fact that farm interests within the
Democratic Party were not sufficiently united to apply effective pressure.
88. E.g., on the 1959 Democratic wheat bill, of the 12 Republicans who opposed their
party's position and voted for the bill, 10 were from big wheat producing states; North
Dakota, South Dakota, Colorado, Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas, Wisconsin and Minnesota (the
2 others were Bennett of Michigan and Springer of Illinois, both of whom are often
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in recent years.89 In wheat therefore, the crop, not the party interest seems
dominant. The two available studies on the problem support a generalized
statement of this conclusion. A study of several roll calls on price-support
bills during the period 1949-1955 found that Congressmen followed con-
stituency interests to a greater degree than party.90 And a more recent study
concludes that the pull of party as compared with constituency influences is
even less strong in congressional committee maneuvering than it is in final
roll call votes on the floor.91 In the agriculture committees, where most of the
important compromises between crop interests must be worked out if a bill
is to succeed,92 the unifying effect of party discipline is weaker, and loyalty
to narrow crop interests is greater. There the impasse in agricultural policy-
making has its roots.
National Farm Organizations
National farm organizations represent broad segments of the farm popula-
tion, and therefore each includes many crop interests. The oldest and largest
of these organizations are the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF),
the National Farmers Union (NFU), and the National Grange. 93 More re-
cently the National Conference of Commodity Organizations 94 and the Na-
tional Farm Organization 95 have been formed. The two organizations most
influential politically, the AFBF and the NFU, have consistently been at odds
on agricultural policy.96 But, as with the two parties, this conflict may be
mavericks on farm support bills); see 15 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 368-69
(1959).
In the 1956 House vote on the conference report on H.R. 12, providing mandatory sup-
ports at 90% of parity, 48 Republicans voted in favor, while 146 opposed. Among the 48
voting in favor were the entire, all-Republican congressional delegations of the states of
North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, and Nebraska. In addition, the entire delegations, Re-
publicans as well as Democrats, of the states of Colorado, Kansas, and Minnesota favored
the bill, with the exceptions of Judd of Minnesota and Scrivner of Kansas. See 12
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 194-95 (1956).
See Pennock, supra note 85, at 174-75.
89. See, e.g., the interpretation of the 1958 congressional election results in 14 CONGRES-
SIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 737-38 (1958); and the 1960 election of Democrat Quentin
Burdick to the U.S. Senate from North Dakota, 18 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY
REPORT 1047, 1139, 1308 (1960).
90. Pennock, supra note 85, at 202, 209-10.
91. Jones, supra note 75, at 367 [Conclusion 1, C, (2)].
92. See Talbot, Farm Legislation in the 86th Congress, 43 J. FAM EcoN. 582, 583-89
(1961).
93. Salisbury, Agriculture and Natural Resources, in PELTASON & BURNS, FUNCTIONS
& POLICIES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 195, 212-14 (1958).
94. See Farm Journal, June 1957, p. 8, and Sept. 1957, p. 10; 15 CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT 926-27 (1957).
95. Talbot, Farm Orgai:ations & the National Interest, 331 Annals 110, 112 (1960);
Soth, Farm Policy, Foreign Policy, & Farm Opinion, 331 Annals 103, 109 (1960) ; see
N.Y. Times, April 4, 1961, p. 27, cols. 5-8.
96. Talbot, supra note 95, at 112-14.
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explained in terms of crop interests. Most crops affiliated with the AFBF-
livestock, corn-livestock, and big cotton-would be benefitted by Republican
free market policies, while the dominant crop interest in the NFU-wheat--
depends on price support programs advocated by the Democrats. 7 The con-
flicts among crops within each organization are less pronounced than the
crop-based conflicts between the two organizations s8 Paradoxically, consist-
ency in the policy positions expressed by the leaders of each organization
may be a result of the multiplicity of internal conflicts. Since none of the
many factions are strong enough to challenge the national leadership, en-
trenched organization spokesmen are usually able to disregard with impunity
the objections of individual crops.99 While the dissidents are free to resign
their membership, they rarely do so because of fringe benefits such as cheap
insurance, cooperative buying and marketing, and social and educational pro-
grams.1
00
As in those even larger conglomerations of interests, the major political
parties, there is much evidence that the pronunciamentos of the national
offices of the major farm organizations carry as much weight as the particular
crop interests that they benefit, and no more. State Bureaus of the AFBF
often appear at congressional hearings to oppose the position of the national
organization when it conflicts with the interests of crops in their own states.10 1
But, even stronger evidence of the importance of particular crop interests
as opposed to the organizational entity can be found in the experience of the
National Conference of Commodity Organizations (NCCO). The NCCO,
a confederation of existing single-crop organizations such as the National
Milk Producers Federation and the Association of Virginia Peanut and Hog
Growers, was formed in 1957 in reaction to the impasse on farm legisla-
tion.10 2 The idea was that through a series of compromises by the member
crop organizations, a single bill, agreed to by all, could be presented to Con-
97. See Salisbury, supra note 93, at 210-13.
98. Ibid.
99. The president of the AFBF, discussing the objections of their tobacco growing
members to an AFBF policy position, said, "We are able to outvote them"; see interview
with Charles Shuman, July 1, 1959; cf. CHRISTENSON, THE BRANNAN PLAN 144 (1959).
See also McCoNNELL, THE DECLINE oF AGRARIAN DEMocRAcY 80-81 (1953).
100. Interview with Earl C. Smith, former president of Illinois Agriculture Associa-
tion (the State Farm Bureau), and vice-president of the AFBF, at Detroit, Illinois, April
1957.
101. E.g., statement of H. L. Wingate, President, Georgia Farm Bureau Federation;
Hearings on S. 3052, the General Farm Program, Before the Senate Committee on Agri-
culture and Forestry, 83rd CONG., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1045-46, 1059-62 (1954) ; Statement of
the Alabama Farm Bureau Federation, Joint Hearing Before Subcommittees of the
Senate and House Committees on Agriculture, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. KK, at 3-5
(1959) ; see statement of John P. Duncan, President, Georgia Farm Bureau Federation,
Hearing on Proposed Reductions in Peanut Price Supports Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-28 (1959).




gress in 1958.103 Many of the interests of member crops, however, conflicted
with each other. 04 Since each member got less than it wanted, all had a
general reluctance to press the final bill on the Congressmen with whom they
had special influence. 10 5 The bill failed,10 6 as did the NCCO a year later,'1 7
demonstrating not only the dominance of narrow crop interests, but also the
intensity of conflict among them.
Economic and Political Change
The politics of agricultural policy-making has not always been so complex
a process of particularized, but vigorous conflict among many small, but
adamant farm interest groups. In 1921, Congressmen representing a broad
range of agricultural interests, and including members of both parties, joined
together in the "Farm Bloc," a formally organized group bent on securing
federal laws to alleviate the agricultural depression which had followed World
War 1.108 In spite of some conflict within the bloc,'0 9 it functioned with in-
creasing success. In the early '20s it achieved the passage of several laws de-
signed to loosen farm credit, and lower the freight rates for transporting
crops to market.110 Later, with the McNary-Haugen bills, the bloc attempted
to secure more direct support for low farm incomes."' This movement cul-
minated in the passage of the first Agricultural Adjustment Act during the
early New Deal.1 1 2 In the later '30s and early '40s, farm bills continued to
103. Ibid.
104. Interview with E.M. Norton, President, and Patrick B. Healy, Secretary, of the
National Milk Producers Federation, leading organizers of NCCO, June 22, 1959.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid; 14 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 271-72 (1958).
107. Mr. Norton said, "We are making no attempt to revive the organization"; In-
terview, supra note 104.
108. The Bloc was organized at a meeting of six Democratic and six Republican
Senators in the Washington offices of the American Farm Bureau Federation on May 9,
1921. It was later enlarged to include twenty-two Senators. CAPPER, THE AGRICULTURAL
BLOC 9-11 (1922).
The membership and the lines of organization were relatively definite and formal.
Senator Kenyon was the recognized leader, and when he went on the federal bench a
year later, he was succeeded by Senator Capper. KLE, THE FARM BUREAU THROUGH
THREE DECADES 109-10 (1948). A similar group existed in the House, but it was some-
what more loosely organized. CAPPER, supra at 12; BENEDICT, FARM PoLIcIEs OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1790-1950 at 182 (1953) ; but see KILE, supra at 101.
109. CAPPER, op. cit. supra note 108, at 148-49.
110. Id. at 157-60; see Hibbard, Legislative Pressure Groups Among Farmers, 179
Annals 17, 19 (1935); BENEDICT, FARM POLICIEs OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1950 at
199 (1953) ; KIIE, THE FARM BUREAU THROUGH THREE DECADES 102-03 (1948).
111. See Black, The McNary-Haugen Movement, 18 Am. EcoN. REV. 268, 271, 405,
410-11, 427; SCHLESINGER, CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER 110 (1957). For the votes on the
1927 bill, see 5 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 108 (1949) ; for the 1928 votes, see
69 CONG. REc. 6283, 7771-72 (1928).
112. 5 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 107 (1949) ; see note 1 supra and ac-
companying text.
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sweep through Congress,113 with the bloc managing to secure favored treat-
ment for agricultural commodities in the Price Control Act of 1942-even in
the face of opposition from a wartime President who had party majorities in
both houses.1 14
Today, however, there is no farm bloc.115 Instead, there is intense conflict
among farm Congressmen, reflecting the concerns of the presently dominant,
narrow, particularized interests.'1 6 Two reasons for this change are suggested.
First, the original goals of the bloc were modest and conservative-perhaps
even palliatives designed to head off the more radical demands of some farm
groups." 17 And its early successes were facilitated by the non-controversial
nature of the bills.118 As the depression became even more widespread and
severe, common privation created near consensus on the necessity of doing
something." 9 After Congress had responded to these relatively non-contro-
versial demands by adopting a program of production control and price sup-
port, and after increased income had made many crop interests less desper-
ate, the relevant issues concerned how individual crop, variety, or area in-
terests would be treated in subsequent legislation. When all interests are
losing money it is comparatively easy for them to unite, but as their con-
dition improves they may begin to feel they can afford the luxury of internal
conflict.
12 0
Second, the rapid technological change in agriculture in recent years has
also contributed to the change in the pattern of conflict in farm politics.
12 1
Chemists have provided improved fertilizers, dusts, and sprays; biologists
have developed new hybrids, serums, and artificial insemination techniques;
and engineers have designed new machines and irrigation methods.' 22 Al-
113. Id. at 103-04.
114. Id. at 102, 110, 112; Hardin, Farm Price Policy & the Farm Vote, 37 J. FARM
EcoN. 601, 604 n.9 (1955).
115. See, e.g., Blair, Farm Bloc Now Split in Many Factions, N.Y. Times, June 14,
1959, § E, p. E7; Kilpatrick, What Happened to the Farm Bloc?, Harper's Magazine,
Nov. 1957, p. 56.
116. Ibid.
117. SHANNON, AMERICAN FARMERS' MOVEMENTS 85-86 (1957).
118. Ibid; see also BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 110, at 181, 198. Many of the original
farm bloc's bills passed by such large margins as to suggest that they were, in fact, non-
controversial; see CAPPER, op. cit. supra note 108, at 159-60.
119. See, e.g., Jennings & Sullivan, Legal Planning for Agriculture, 42 YALE L.J.
878, 917-18 (1933) ; Soth, Conflicts in Farm-Price Policy, 9 ANTIOCH REV. 60, 61 (1949).
120. Interview with Dr. W.W. Wilcox, Legislative Reference Service, Library of
Congress, June 24, 1959. See also Taylor, Farmers' Movements as Psychosocial Phcnomena,
in 23 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SocIErY, PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 153, 153-55 (1928);
Sperling, Apathy Tassels in Corn Belt, from the Christian Science Monitor, July 17, 1958,
reprinted in 104 CONG. REC. 16452 (1958).
121. For a more generalized statement on the relation of technological change to
political change, see TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 502 (1955).
122. See Calvert, Technological Revohtion in Agriculture, 1910-1955, in 30 AGRI-
CULTURAL HISTORY 18, 19 (1956); for the most recent data, see U.S. DEP'T oF AGRI-
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though natural conditions of terrain, climate, soil type, and access to markets
lead different areas to specialize in different crops to some extent, these
recent technological innovations have accelerated the process of specializa-
tion.12 3 Since it is expensive, and usually inefficient for a farmer to acquire
the machinery and skills necessary to raise each of several crops, the farmers
in each region have concentrated on the few crops best suited to that land,
adopting only as much of the new technology as those crops require. There-
fore, any given region is now likely to contain fewer crop interests than was
the case when agriculture was less specialized. Since political representa-
tion is allocated geographically, each Congressman now has fewer interests in
his district than formerly. This limits his concern to a narrower range of in-
terests. Moreover, the localization of particular crops means that there is less
overlap of interests among the several congressional districts. Consequently,
less common ground exists among the Congressmen to form a basis for com-
promise, and all the economic conflicts within agriculture are able to obtain
political expression. In addition to specialization, dividing the old farm bloc
into many narrow factions, technological innovation has also changed the con-
figuration of farm interests by creating several entirely new interest groups,
not previously contained by the bloc. Such new interests may occur through
the introduction of a new crop or variety, which changes the interest of an
old farming area,' 24 or through technological changes which open a new area
to agriculture. 12r Thus, in its several ways, technological change has produced
a proliferation of farm interests.
IMPASSE
This proliferation of interests within agriculture has created a stalemate on
farm policy. Congressional procedures are such that a concerted minority in-
terest can usually block action distasteful to it through various obstructive
tactics, if the interest has sufficient access to strategic points in the legisla-
tive process.' 26 Many farm interests have access through the agriculture com-
mittees, without whose approval no farm bill is likely to be adopted. 27 The
proliferation of interests has meant that there are now many groups, each
CULTURE, STATISTICAL BULLETIN No. 233, CHANGES IN FARd PRODUCTION & EFFCIENCY
(rev. ed. 1961). See also Frey, Manure Smell Furnishes Farmstead's Power Needs, Gas
Produced From Dung; Fertili.aer Value Saved, Great Britian's Pig Farming Magazine,
reprinted in National Hog Farmer, March 1961, P. 35.
123. See Calvert, supra note 122, at 24; Speech by H.L. Stewart, U.S. Dep't of Agri-
culture, 39th Annual Agricultural Outlook Conference, Nov. 16, 1961, p. 8.
124. See, e.g., the case of grain sorghum, 104 CoNG. REc. 16452 (1958) (remarks of
Representative Harvey); N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1961 (Financial), p. F1, col. 5.
125. See, e.g., the introduction of new, long-staple cotton into the Southwest through
improved technology, notes 43-51 supra and accompanying text.
126. See Talbot, Farm Legislation it the 86th Congress, 43 J. FAxM EcoN. 582, 595,
605 (1961).
127. Id. at 585-90.
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trying to obstruct the others' programs. The sum of all these obstructionist
tactics has been impasse.
The AFBF Plans
The fate of some recent proposals of the American Farm Bureau Federa-
tion (AFBF), the largest, most influential farm organization, illustrates this
impasse. In an effort to achieve its general goal, reliance on free market forces
to solve the ills of agriculture, the Farm Bureau has suggested, as a first step,
the lowering of price support levels.'28 To accomplish this the AFBF advo-
cates abandonment of programs tying support levels to a "parity" concept. 20
Instead, the AFBF would peg the level of price supports at a given percentage
(probably between 75 and 90) of the average market price of the crop over
the three preceding years.180 In addition, acreage restrictions would be re-
moved.1 31 The Farm Bureau argues that such rolling-three-year average sup-
ports would, by approximating free market prices, effect a more efficient alloca-
tion of resources, yet insure that possible price declines would be gradual.1
32
More recently, the AFBF has advocated a "crop land adjustment" program as
an alternate path to freer markets. 3 3 Under this plan, the government would
rent from farmers, on the basis of competitive bids, a predetermined number of
acres which would then be removed from production entirely. 134 Price supports
and acreage restrictions would be eliminated.135 Participation in the program
would be voluntary, and except for the land idled, resources would be allo-
cated by free market forces.' 36 But the blow to those hardest hit by this
change would be somewhat softened: presumably, those farmers who were
able to make the least profit from their acres would offer them to the govern-
ment at the lowest price. And to the extent the idling of land lessened the
production of these low value, super-abundant crops, it would benefit the
lower cost farmers still producing them by raising their prices.
128. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Dec. 5, 1961, p. 17, cols. 2-3; Nation's Agriculture,
Jan. 1962, p. 8.
129. 14 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALM1ANAC 272 (1958); Nation's Agriculture,
Jan. 1962, p. 7.
130. Ibid; Interview with Charles Shuman, President of AFBF, July 1, 1959.
131. See Nation's Agriculture, Jan. 1962, p. 8; Wall Street Journal, Dec. 5, 1961, p.
17, col. 2.
132. Interview with Charles Shuman, President, AFBF, July 1, 1959; Interview with
Roger Fleming, Secretary-Treasurer, AFBF, July 8, 1959. The price declines would be
gradual since market prices in the past were supported by supply control operations. Even
in the second year under the system, two-thirds of the rolling three year average supports
would come from the period of supported pricing. Thus, not until the fourth year of the
program would the average be entirely composed of prices set under a free market system
-and, whenever the system was used it would insulate the farmer from a precipitous de-
cline in any one year.






However sound these proposals may be from an economic standpoint, their
political appeal is slight. Two major interest groups would benefit. Interests
such as livestock producers and food processors which consume supported
products would benefit from the elimination of price supports. And interests
in new areas, having no history of production, would benefit from the elimina-
tion of acreage restrictions. But ranged against these interests would be all
groups whose crops are currently supported. Supports and restrictions are
particularly important in such super-abundant crops as wheat.137 The present
system is also very important to growers who have acquired a history of
production.13 8 And, of course, all those interests which would suffer from
abandonment of the present system oppose the AFBF proposals.
The Brannan Plan
In a sense, the plan sponsored by Charles F. Brannan, President Truman's
Secretary of Agriculture,139 was also directed at the establishment of free
markets in agricultural commodities. But the Brannan Plan was opposed by
many of the same interests which now support the Farm Bureau's movements
in that direction. The contradiction is more apparent than real. Although
Brannan would have allowed the total production to sell at whatever price
it would bring on the free market, thus eliminating storage costs,140 his Plan
imposed such a strict system of production controls that it has become a
political symbol of the very antithesis of a free market.' 41 In addition, if any
decreases in farmers' net incomes occurred under free market pricing in spite
of the restrictions on supply, the Brannan Plan called for "compensatory
payments" to the farmers.'4 In other words, the Plan would have directly
137. One study estimated that if restrictions were removed and price supports lowered
to levels that would permit an orderly reduction in wheat surpluses over a 7 to 10 year
period, net cash receipts would have decreased 60% to 75% by 1965 from the 1955-57 level.
S. REP. No. 77, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1960). The report was prepared by the techni-
cal staff of the U.S. Dep't of Agriculture in conjunction with Dr. W.W. Wilcox, Library
of Congress, and the Land-Grant Colleges Interregional Technical Advisory Committee on
National Policies for Agricultural Prices and Income (usually called IRM-1, not because
it means anything, but because nobody can remember the full name).
138. See notes 43-55 supra and accompanying text.
139. Mr. Brannan, a lawyer, started his career as an attorney for the Resettlement
Administration in the mid '30s, and worked his way up through the ranks. He is now
General Counsel of the National Farmers Union. Interview with Hon. Charles F. Brannan,
at NFU Annual Convention, in Springfield, Illinois, March 17, 1959.
140. See BENEDICT, FARM PoLIcIEs OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1950 at 486-87
(1953) ; SOTH, FMAu TRouBLE 145-46 (1957).
141. See SOTH, op. cit. supra note 140, at 15.
142. These payments are alternatively labelled "direct payments," "compensatory pay-
ments," "income payments," or "production payments"; see BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note
140, at 486-87; SoTH, op. cit. supra note 140, at 144-45; Salisbury, Agriculture and Natural
Resources, in PELTASON & BuRxs, FUNCTIONS & POLICIES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 195,
216 (1958) ; Brandow, Current Programs in Relation to Needed Adjustments, in HEAVY,
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROBLEMS IN A GROWING ECONOMY 236, 246-47 (1958).
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supported farmers' incomes, while only indirectly supporting their prices
through production control. Since many different factors affect farm income,
making it difficult to determine how much the new program had decreased
each farmer's net revenues, and thus how much compensation he was entitled
to, the Plan proposed to base payments on the difference between the pre-
vailing market price for each bushel the farmer produced and the legislated
"parity" price.143 But this made the size of the payments dependent on the
size of the output, necessitating strict planting restrictions to minimize sur-
pluses, raise prices, and avoid great costs to the government.
1 44 As another
measure to reduce the cost of the programs, and to encourage the "family
farm" size of productive unit, the Plan limited the total amount of compensa-
tory payments to any one farmer.
145
While the Brannan Plan received some support from lower-income farm
groups, from the most severely distressed crops (like wheat) to whom it
offered a port in a storm, and from labor unions who apparently hoped that
the free market pricing would result in cheaper groceries, the opposition was
more than enough to overwhelm it.146 In fact, the Plan was caught in a cross-
fire because it had both free market and production control aspects. Live-
stock farmers, as consumers of supported commodities, feared that the strict
acreage restrictions would drive up prices. Processors opposed the produc-
tion controls which would reduce their volume of business. And, new pro-
ducing areas were opposed to these history-based allotments for the same
reasons that they oppose the present ones. Big farmers, generally, argued that
the tight controls, the direct support of incomes by government, and the
limitation on the amount of payments to any one producer which would give
proportionately fewer benefits to larger farmers, all added up to "social-
ism.,,147
At the same time, the Plan was opposed by many of the interests that favor
high price supports.' 48 The producers presently receiving price supports
were afraid that the acreage restrictions would not be sufficient to keep prices
up, necessitating very large payments to give them full compensation, and
that the growing urban power in Congress would prevent the continuation of
substantial appropriations for these purposes. 49 Furthermore, corn and small
143. See CHRISTENSON, THE BRANNAN PLAN 34-35 (1959) ; BENEDICT, op. Cit. supra
note 140, at 485.
144. See BENEDICT, op. Cit. Htpra note 140, at 486.
145. Id. at 487; CHRISTENSON, op. cit. supra note 143, at 39-40, 70-71.
146. See Salisbury, supra note 142, at 216-17; SOTH, op. cit. supra note 140, at 15-17;
CHRISTENSON, op. cit. supra note 143, at 163.
147. See Salisbury, supra note 142, at 216-17; SOTH, op. cit. supra note 140, at 15, 145;
CHRISTENSON, op. cit. supra note 143, at 87-88.
148. See MCCONNELL, THE DECLINE OF AGRARIAN DEMOCRACY 142 (1953) (quoting
74 WALLACES' FARMER & IOWA HOMESTEAD 886 (1949) ; CHRISTENSON, op. cit. supra note
143, at 163.
149. This was thought to be especially likely since direct payments would make the
extent of the subsidies much more obvious than do price supports; see CHRISTENSON, op.
cit. supra note 143, at 38, 80; Salisbury, supra note 142, at 217.
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feed grain interests feared that if the price of wheat dropped, wheat would com-
pete with them as animal feed.'5 0 These interests made a prediction about the
results of the Plan on farm prices which was the exact opposite of that made
by the consuming interests, but the two conflicting groups shared a common
fear of the new, untried scheme.
Proposals of University Economists
Many economists have suggested the desirability of ultimate return to a free
market system. Of course these proposals would meet the same opposition as
the AFBF plans, unless they contained more appealing transitional schemes.
Some economists, however, do not seem to take the political requisites of
success into account. In his "Forward Pricing" plan, for example, Professor
D. Gale Johnson would rely primarily on the free market, but would moderate
its effect by requiring the government to estimate and guarantee probable
free market prices before farmers made production decisions.' 5' Like the
AFBF plans, "Forward Pricing" would seem subject to fatal objections. To
the extent super-abundant crop interests believe the government will accurately
predict free market prices, they will fear precipitous price declines. 1r2 Eleven
years after proposing his plan, Professor Johnson noted that he had not
observed "any substantial political support" developing for it. 1 53 Another
economist, Professor Hendrik S. Houthakker, has recognized the necessity of
"appeal to agricultural interests in Congress," but his plan seems to lack such
appeal. 15 4 To ease the transition from price supports and acreage restrictions
to free markets, Professor Houthakker would have the government make
payments to farmers based on the number of acres they normally have in
production of crops which had been supported. 5 5 It seems doubtful, however,
that this compensation would mollify the large number of interests presently
benefitting from government programs since the payments would be very
modest and would decline in succeeding years. 56
150. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
151. Johnson, Government & Agriculture: Is Agriculture A Special Case?, 1 J. L. &
EcoN. 122, 129-30 (1958).
152. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1962, p. 14, col. 2 (President's Agricultural Message to
Congress) ; note 137 supra and study cited.
153. Johnson, supra note 151, at 130.
154. Houthakker, Toward a Solution of the Farm Problem, 43 REV. OF Ecoxomics &
STATIsTics 63 (1961).
155. Id. at 64-65.
156. Id. at 64-66. The political flaw is summed up by Houthakker himself. While re-
assuring the reader that he is aiming toward an absolutely free market, and that his
program would be only a transitional measure, he concludes with a particularly unfortunate
metaphor: "The appeal of this proposal... is to those who ... recognize the wisdom of
tempering the wind to the shorn lamb." Id. at 66. If you inform the sheep that they are
about to be shorn, you can hardly expect them to behave like lambs, or to stand still while
you fleece them.
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The "Do-It-Yourself' Plan
Since all of the various farm interests, or even a working majority of them,
cannot agree on an overall approach to the farm problem, the Kennedy Ad-
ministration's first proposal was a system whereby each crop could write its
own program.157 The Secretary of Agriculture would appoint a committee
representing the producers of the crop to draw up a plan. 5 s If approved by
the Secretary, and two-thirds of the crop's producers voting in a referendum,
the plan would become law unless Congress vetoed it within 60 daysY
Quite apart from the objection that a myriad of crop programs working at
cross purposes would make no economic sense, this Kennedy "do-it-yourself"
plan was killed for good political reasons. Congressmen who had achieved
seniority in the agriculture committees were unwilling to relinquish their
personal power to shape farm legislation; and the particular interest groups
they favored were unwilling to have them relinquish it.160 Moreover, competing
crop interests feared that while they might be able to work out delicate com-
promises with other interests in the normal legislative process, under the
do-it-yourself plan they would be presented with a fait accompli; they would
then have to muster enough power in Congress to overturn this program
within 60 days.161 This first Kennedy proposal died in committee.
0 2
PROGNOSIS
Given the proliferation of narrow, conflicting interests within agriculture,
can any politically feasible program be designed to achieve decreased agri-
cultural production? The passage of the 1961 Emergency Feed Grains Bill
indicated that some changes can be made.1 3 This program offered feed grain
producers higher price supports in return for 20% acreage reductions. 0 4 In
addition, if the land taken out of production of feed grains was not planted
in other crops, the government paid a rental for it, either in cash or in
grain.165 To further induce participation in the plan, the Secretary of Agri-
culture was authorized to sell government stocks of feed grains at less than
157. See N.Y. Times, March 17, 1961, p. 1, col. 6. This proposal was similar to one
element of the Poage Bill, which had been defeated in 1960; see Talbot, Farm Legislation in
the 86th Congress, 43 J. FARM EcoN. 582, 595 (1961).
158. N.Y. Times, March 17, 1961, p. 1, col. 6.
159. Ibid; adverse action by a majority of either house would prevent its adoption. The
bill was later amended to provide that the plans be placed before Congress for the 60 day
period before the referendum of farmers was held; N.Y. Times, April 18, 1961, p. 22, cols.
3-4.
160. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 25, 1961, p. 25, cols. 1-2; N.Y. Times, June 4, 1961,
p. 57, cols. 1-3.
161. Interview with Hon. E.A. Jaenke, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Jan. 12 1962.
162. See 19 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT 1269 (1961).
163. See N.Y. Times, March 10, 1961, p. 1, col. 8; p. 15, cols. 1-5.
164. Id. at p. 15, col. 3.
165. Ibid; Wall Street Journal, Dec. 5, 1961, p. 1, col. 1.
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the support price, to depress the prices on the open market where non-parti-
cipants would have to sell.'0 6
Although the Emergency Feed Grains Bill has received strong criticism,
the present trend seems to be toward trying to achieve more satisfactory re-
suits within the framework of the old high supports and tight controls ap-
proach. Critics have argued that the controls have not really been effective;
farmers have always found a way to increase output on the acres remaining
in production. 67 The Administration has answered that, in spite of this, their
program last year effected the first reduction in feed grain supplies since the
end of the Korean War. 68 And their opponents have replied that this de-
crease was purchased at too great a cost.169 To an extent, the Kennedy Ad-
ministration would agree with these critics. Therefore, in his recent farm
message to Congress, the President proposed to make controls more effective
by applying them directly to the amounts the farmer sells, as well as to the
number of acres he plants, through a system of "marketing quota certifi-
cates.' 170 These stricter controls have already received opposition from those
interest groups that oppose the present systems of control-the consumers of
supported commodities, the processors whose volume of business would be
reduced, and the growers of supported crops in new producing areas (since
allocation of certificates would also be based on production history). 171 In
addition, the marketing quota controls may be opposed by some of the interests
that support the present system of acreage limitation. The very ineffectiveness
of the present controls has made it possible for many producers of supported
crops to avoid severe cut-backs in production, thus allowing them to make
great profits at the prevailing, relatively high level of price supports. 172 How-
ever, since these farmers have been in the forefront in advocating the support
and control approach, it would be very awkward for them to oppose an at-
tempt to make such a system really work. In spite of the opposition to tighter
controls, many observers believe there is a good chance Congress will adopt
166. N.Y. Times, March 10, 1961, p. 15, col. 3.
167. See Wall Street Journal, Dec. 5, 1961, p. 1, col. 1; p. 17, cols. 2-3; N.Y. Times,
Oct. 2, 1961, p. 25, cols. 1-4; N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1961, p. 30, cols. 2-4.
168. See Wall Street Journal, Dec. 5, 1961, p. 1, col. 1.
169. Id. at p. 1, col. 1; p. 17, col. 2.
170. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1962, p. 14, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1962, p. 69, cols. 1-4.
Professor Willard Cochrane, formerly of the University of Minnesota, now chief economic
adviser to Secretary Freeman, suggested this sort of program in a book some three years
ago; CocHiamiE, FA~m PlucEs 168-78 (1958).
171. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Dec. 5, 1961, p. 17, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Jan. 25,
1962, p. 19, cols. 1-2; N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1962, p. 15, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1962,
§ 1, p. 41, col. 1.
172. See, e.g., the prediction that dairy farmers might oppose tighter controls since,
"Thanks to the Government's open-end purchasing commitment and to increased price-sup-
port rates, this clan has been faring pretty well." Wall Street Journal, Dec. 13, 1961, p. 1,
col. 1; and the observation that such opposition is beginning to take shape; N.Y. Times,
Feb. 19, 1962, p. 18, col. 1.
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the certificate plan for wheat, where the oversupply problem is very serious. 7 3
Such a program is favored by the National Farmers Union, the National
Association of Wheat Growers, and the National Grange. 74
When the same farm interests control both the legislative and the execu-
tive branches of government, there is a greater possibility of enacting changes
in farm policy. Since there is a broad correlation between commodity interest
and party affiliation,175 to that extent, innovation will be more likely when the
same party controls both branches. During the first two years of the Eisen-
hower Administrations, the Republicans also controlled Congress, and Re-
publican farm interests were able to switch the level of price supports from a
"rigid," 90% of parity, to a "flexible" (and lower), sliding scale.1 06 During
the next six years, after the Democrats gained control of Congress, the Presi-
dent vetoed several bills that reflected the Democratic configuration of farm
interests, 177 and Congress refused to pass several measures reflecting Re-
publican interests which were supported by the Agriculture Department.'1 "
The fact that the Democrats now control both branches does not guarantee
that change will be easy to secure, however. Republican-oriented farm inter-
ests, like any determined minority having access to strategic points in the
legislative process, will often be able to prevent the passage of new legislation
obnoxious to them, although they might not have sufficient power to secure
positive gains for themselves. And, there is enough diversity of crop interest
within the Democratic Party to cause serious intra-party conflict.'7 0 More-
over, this crop conflict divides the congressional and Presidential wings of
the Party somewhat: the Southern crops control the congressional machin-
ery, 80 and the Northern-wheat-National Farmers Union interests dominate
the Department of Agriculture.' 8' It is clear, however, that any change which
is to be enacted must at least come within the limitations imposed by the
broad aggregate of Democratic farm interests-which is to say that it must
come within the system of supports and history-based controls.' 82 Therefore,
it seems, the most attractive prospect available is to make these programs as
173. See Wall Street Journal, Dec. 5, 1961, p. 17, col. 3.
174. Ibid.
175. See notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text.
176. 10 CoNGassIONA. QuARTERLY ALMANAC 100 (1954).
177. See, e.g., 12 CoNGREssIoNAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 387 (1956); 15 CoNGRas-
sioNAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 238-41 (Wheat Bill), 242-43 (Tobacco Bill) (1959).
178. See, e.g., 12 CoNGREssIONAL QuARTERLY ALMANAC 94 (1956) ; 15 CoNamRsSIONA
QUARTERLY ALMANAC 94 (1959).
179. See note 87 upra.
180. See Jones, Representation in Congress: The Case of the House Agriculture Com-
inittee, 55 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 358, 360 (1961).
181. Secretary Freeman is a former Governor of Minnesota; see also the large number
of NFU men appointed to high Department of Agriculture posts; N.Y. Times, March 5,
1961, p. 50, cols. 1-2.
182. See notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text.
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effective as possible in controlling supply; by raising the market price above
support levels, this would minimize the amount of produce the government
would have to absorb and the amount of payments the government would have
to make.
No great changes can be expected in farm policy until there has been a sub-
stantial realignment of interested groups. This need not require an alteration
of farm interests. A significant increase in the activity of non-farm interests
on agricultural legislation might effect revision. An aroused consumer public,
for example, could secure major reforms of the programs. But in politics the
participants appear to observe a rule similar to the legal doctrines of standing,
or sufficiency of interest. Unless they are more directly involved or have a
more immediate interest in the issue at hand than do all the members of the
public, they take little part in the controversy.183 Since grocery bills are com-
manding smaller and smaller shares of the household budget,'84 it is especially
unlikely that the public will become sufficiently aroused to effect a major
change. Furthermore, the complexity of agricultural problems makes it pecul-
iarly difficult to develop any broad public opinion informed enough to be
influential.
It is also unlikely that the immediate future will bring enough change in
the configuration of farm interests to produce major innovations in policy.
Technological advance has created many smaller and more specialized inter-
est groups-and, in many cases, the interests of these groups conflict. 85
Therefore, power has been fragmented. There is now no bloc with sufficient
power to move policy in any one direction. 86 Moreover, the multitudes of
narrow interests generate multitudes of narrow issues, which are likely to be
highly technical.187 The bills sometimes become so complicated that even the
183. See Tolley, The Administration's Score on the First Round, 43 J. FARe Ecox.
1032, 1036 (1961). Although urban newspapers occasionally publish an editorial attacking
the programs; see N.Y. Times, March 12, 1961, p. 10E, col. 2; city Congressmen,
usually very sensitive to public opinion, still feel that it is safe to vote for bills that will
aid the farm interests in their Party; interview with Hon. Victor Anfuso, U.S. Repre-
sentative from Brooklyn, N.Y., former Member of House Committee on Agriculture,
July 1, 1959; see also N.Y. Times, March 10, 1961, p. 1, col. 8; p. 15, cols. 1-3; N.Y. Times,
April 9, 1961, p. 34, col. 3; especially if they can secure rural support for urban bills in re-
turn; see 104 CONG. REc. 17634-35 (1958) (remarks of Representative Anfuso).
Furthermore, businessmen in smaller communities are big beneficiaries of the increases
in farm income brought by the programs; see Wall Street Journal, Dec. 1, 1961, p. 1, col. 6.
184. See speech by H.L. Stewart, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, at 39th Annual Agri-
cultural Outlook Conference, in Washington, D.C., Nov. 16, 1961, p. 14.
185. See notes 121-25 supra and accompanying text. Because of the interrelations
among crop interests, the increase in the number of interests has produced an increase in the
number of points of contact, and therefore of possibilities for conflict, among them; see
KFy, PoLrrrcs, PARTIEs, & PREssuRE GROUPS 149 (3d ed. 1952).
186. See, e.g., Brandow, Reshaping Farm Policy in 1961, 43 J. FARMu EcoN. 1019,
1019, 1028 (1961).
187. See id. at 1027.
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farm interests cannot discern how each of them would be affected.' 88 There
is now more conflict, and it is more complex and particular. The result has
been impasse in agricultural policy-making. It is likely to continue.
188. In 1960, Representative Hoeven, ranking minority member of the House Com-
mittee on Agriculture, opposed the passage of a farm bill, asking, "Does it make sense
that we should in these last days of the session pass a bill which is so complex and so
complicated that no one really knows how it will affect our agricultural economy?" 16
CONGESSIONAL QuARTERLY ALMANA C 331 (1960).
